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THE SEATTLE SOLUTION: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY
FOR-HIRE DRIVERS & PROSPECTS FOR PRO-LABOR
FEDERALISM

Charlotte Garden*

INTRODUCTION

Well before the 2016 presidential election, worker movements like
"Fight for Fifteen" had begun to rack up wins in left-leaning states and
cities on issues including the minimum wage and paid sick time. Then the
election made necessity out of virtue, with states and cities adopting a key
role in resisting policies of the Trump administration. Now, with the Trump
National Labor Relations Board and Department of Labor starting to roll
back pro-worker gains made during the Obama administration, this
emerging progressive federalism has only become more important for
improving working conditions and expanding opportunities for workers'
collective action.
This essay focuses on one innovative workers' rights measure: a Seattle
ordinance allowing taxi and for-hire drivers who are classified as
independent contractors to unionize and bargain collectively. This law is
largely a response to precarious working conditions in the app-based "gig
economy," which depends on an army of workers who are paid by the task
and who do not receive protections usually afforded employees.' A key idea
behind the ordinance - the Seattle solution - is that the most expedient way
to improve working conditions for these workers, who are regarded as
ineligible for key employment protections yet who are powerless to bargain
a better deal on an individual basis, is through increased collective
12

leverage.
As Part I of this essay discusses, Seattle's driver bargaining ordinance is
considerably more protective of workers' collective action than the NLRA.
Thus, it is possible that even those drivers who are covered by Seattle's law
who should arguably be classified as employees may actually wind up
Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law.
1 See Daniel Beekman, City Council Member Says Let Uber Drivers Unionize, THE
SEATTLE TIMEs, Aug. 31, 2015, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/seattlelawmaker-plans-to-help-for-hire-drivers-unionize/.
2 Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 ¶ I (Dec. 23, 2015) (codified at SEATTLE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE §§ 6.310.110, 6.310.735 (2017)).
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better off than they would be if they challenged their classification as
independent contractors, particularly considering the costs and uncertain
outcomes of such challenges. However, it is also possible that the ordinance
will be struck down, and Part II canvasses pending legal challenges to the
Seattle ordinance, which is now temporarily enjoined by the Ninth Circuit.3
Finally, Part III discusses legal and political barriers to the Seattle solution,
concluding that they are not insurmountable.

I. THE SEATTLE SOLUTION

In December 2015, the Seattle City Council unanimously passed an
ordinance (the "ordinance" or the "driver bargaining ordinance") creating a
collective bargaining system for for-hire drivers who were classified as
independent contractors, including both app-based and traditional taxi
drivers.4 The ordinance was the product of lobbying by Uber and Lyft
drivers who were frustrated by capricious treatment by the transportation
network companies (TNCs) and taxi dispatchers on which they depended
for income.5 The drivers - many of whom were from Somali and Sikh
immigrant communities - were supported by Teamsters Local 117, which
already had experience supporting collective action by drivers classified as
independent contractors, including both taxi and TNC drivers. 6 This section
briefly describes the ordinance and illustrates several ways that it is more
protective of workers than the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). It
then discusses the ordinance's somewhat difficult path from unanimous city
council vote to rulemaking and the brink of implementation.
A. The Ordinance
Much like the NLRA, the ordinance begins with a statement of purpose
Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, No. 17-35640, at 2 (9th Cir. Sep. 7, 2017)
(order granting injunction).
4 CB 118499, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK (Dec. 14, 2015),
https://seattle.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2451983&GUID=E69B3AB7-88E149 1A-A49F-B32BE688D 16C&Options=Advanced& Search= (follow "Action Details"
hyperlink for Action By "Full Council" on Dec. 14, 2015).
5 Sonia Singh, Seattle Uber Drivers Win Right to Bargain, LABOR NOTES (Jan. 28,
2016), http://www.labomotes.org/2016/01/seattle-uber-drivers-win-right-bargain.
6 Teamsters Local 117 backs both the Western Washington Taxicab Operators
Association, and the App-Based Drivers Association. The union describes both groups as
"membership association[s] that promote[] fairness, justice, and transparency." TEAMSTER
TAXI, http://www.teamstertaxi.org/; App Based Drivers Association, About Us, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/pg/abdaseattle/about/?ref=pageinternal. For a description of
some of the collective action undertaken by drivers with the support of these groups, see
Dawn Gearhart, Giving Uber Drivers a Voice in the Gig Economy, in TOwARDS A FAIRER
GIG ECONOMY 13 (Mark Graham & Joe Shaw eds., 2017).
3
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grounded in both commercial stability and worker rights. In a representative
provision, the ordinance states "[c]ollective negotiation processes in other
industries have achieved public health and safety outcomes for the general
public and improved the reliability and stability of the industries at issue ...
In other parts of the transportation industry, for example, collective
negotiation processes have reduced accidents and improved driver and
vehicle safety performance." 7 Similar to the NLRA, this introductory
language may decrease the likelihood that the ordinance is struck down by a
court, a topic discussed in the next section.
Further echoing the NLRA (as well as nearly all public sector US labor
the ordinance makes an elected union the exclusive representative of
the qualifying drivers who work for one enterprise. 9 In the ordinance's
parlance, labor organizations that seek to represent drivers are called
"qualified driver representatives" (QDRs) and a QDR that has been certified
as the elected representative of a group of drivers becomes an "exclusive
driver representative" (EDR). 10 QDRs must satisfy a minimal list of
requirements, including non-profit status, democratic structure, and
experience reaching agreements between employers and contractors."
Organizations that apply and are designated by the city to be QDRs are also
required to declare their potential organizing targets within a short window
after being approved. 12
law8 ),

Unlike under the NLRA, QDRs are entitled to receive a list of drivers'
names and contact information from TNCs or taxi companies ("driver
coordinators") at the beginning of the organizing drive. 13 Then, the QDR
has 120 days to solicit drivers' statements of interest in collective
representation by the QDR.14 At the end of the 120-day period, the city
conducts a card check and the QDR becomes an EDR if it has collected
statements of interest from a majority of qualified drivers included on the
contact list.15

7

Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 ¶ J (Dec. 23, 2015) (codified at
6.310.110, 6.310.735 (2017)).

SEATTLE, WASH.,

MUN. CODE §§
8

Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquiry Into a

"Unique" American Principle, 20 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 47 (1998).
9 Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 ¶ I (Dec. 23, 2015) (codified at SEATTLE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE §§ 6.310.110, 6.310.735 (2017)).
10 SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.310.110 (2017).
SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.310.735 ¶B (2017).
12Id. C2.
13 Id. ¶D.
14
Id. ¶F1.
15 The ordinance does not define qualified driver; the definition adopted in a
rulemaking is discussed in the next subsection.
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Once an EDR is selected, the ordinance imposes a good faith bargaining
requirement; it also lists a handful of mandatory subjects of bargaining,
including safety-related measures, pay, and work hours, while allowing
other mandatory subjects to be designated through rulemaking.16 But the
bargaining parties are not free to reach any agreement they choose. Rather,
once an enterprise and an EDR reach an agreement, they must submit it to
the director of the city's Department of Finance and Administrative
services; the approval process directs the FAS director to consider whether
the agreement will "promote[] the provision of safe, reliable, and
economical for-hire transportation services," and permits public hearings on
that topic. 17
The ordinance also improves on the NLRA in how it treats negotiations
that do not result in an agreement. Whereas the NLRA leaves parties at
impasse to resort to their economic weapons, such as strikes & lock-outs,
and allows the employer to unilaterally implement its last, best, and final
offer, the ordinance allows either party to call for interest arbitration once
three months of bargaining has elapsed without agreement.1 8 Then, the
arbitrator is empowered to impose up to a two-year agreement, subject to
city approval. 19
Finally, the ordinance allows for meaningful enforcement and
substantial penalties of up to $10,000 for each day that enterprises or QDRs
interfere with or retaliate against drivers who attempt to exercise their rights
under the ordinance, or otherwise violate the statute - including by
bargaining in bad faith. 2 0 Not only is the city authorized to investigate and
pursue alleged violations, 2 1 but the ordinance also creates a private right of
action and allows attorneys' fees to be awarded.22
All of these measures should be cause for celebration for unions and
worker advocates, many of whom have argued that the NLRA would be
more likely to fulfill its mandate - to "encourag[e] the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining" 2 3 - if it mandated card check elections,
allowed parties at impasse to participate in interest arbitration, and imposed
greater penalties on labor law violators.
There is one aspect of the ordinance, however, that is more controversial
16 SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE
17

Id. ¶H2.
Id. 1.

19

Id. 12.

Id. ¶¶ K & Mb3.
Id. M1.
22 Id. ¶M3.
23 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2017).
20

21

§ 6.310.735 ¶H1 (2017).
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among union advocates: it assumes that drivers are properly classified as
independent contractors.2 4 Of course, that classification will be accurate as
to at least some drivers. But even where it is less clear that drivers were
properly classified by the enterprises for which they work, it could be that
robust collective bargaining rights will lead to contracts that are at least as
valuable as statutory employment rights - particularly considering the steep
potential enforcement costs associated with those rights. Or, from another
perspective, the ordinance gives drivers the bargaining power that
independent contractors theoretically have, but that for-hire drivers
25
generally lack absent collective power.
B. From Enactment to Rulemaking & Implementation
The ordinance was one in a string of recent Seattle laws designed to
improve working conditions. Over the last three years, Seattle has begun
requiring employers to provide paid "sick and safe" leave,26 created an
Office of Labor Standards to target wage theft, 2 7 passed legislation that will
raise the minimum wage to $15/hour, 2 8 and required certain employers to
follow fair scheduling practices.29 These improvements - often situated as a
necessary response to increasing income inequality and rising rents in
booming Seattle - were part of the impetus for the driver bargaining
ordinance. As the city council put it in a press release: "Over the past few
years, Seattle has implemented ordinances to raise local labor standards that
these drivers are exempt from . . . This legislation gives drivers a chance to
address these issues in their industry."3 0
Nonetheless, the ordinance was not without controversy even within
Seattle's progressive, pro-worker government. Although the ordinance
passed the Seattle City Council unanimously, Seattle Mayor Ed Murray
refused to sign it, allowing the ordinance to go into effect without his
The ordinance exempts any drivers who are classified as employees, so if an NLRB
proceeding results in a finding that all or some drivers were misclassified as independent
contractors, the effect would be to exclude those drivers from coverage under the
ordinance. Alternatively, an enterprise could evade the ordinance by re-classifying its
Seattle drivers as employees.
25 See Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (observing that Lyft
drivers "don't seem much like independent contractors," because "[w]e generally
understand an independent contractor to be someone with a special skill (and with the
bargaining power to negotiate a rate for the use of that skill)").
24

26

Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 123698 (Sep. 23, 2011), http://bit.1y/2vsOcPz.

Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124645 (Dec. 2, 2014), http://bit.y/2vJVMk1.
28 SEATTLE WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.19.005 et seq. (2017).
29 SEATTLE WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.22 (2017).
30 Council Unanimously Adopts First-of-its-KindLegislation
to Give Drivers a Voice
on
the
Job,
SEATTLE
CITY
COUNCIL
(Dec.
14,
2015,
3:25
PM),
https://www.seattle.gov/council/issues/giving-drivers-a-voice.
27
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endorsement. In a public statement, Murray praised transportation network
companies ("TNCs") like Uber and Lyft for "providing valuable new tools
for city residents and innovating at a tremendous pace," and criticized the
city council for committing Seattle to "relatively unknown costs" associated
with administering the ordinance, promulgating rules under it, and then
implementing those rules.3 1 Murray elaborated in a letter to city
councilmembers, listing cost concerns in more detail and complaining that
the bill left key terms - including which drivers would be eligible to bargain
collectively - to be defined during a subsequent rulemaking process.3 2
Part of Mayor Murray's reticence may trace back to Seattle's first
attempt to regulate TNCs such as Uber & Lyft, which took place after both
companies began operating in the city without authorization. In March
2014, the city council unanimously passed a suite of TNC regulations that
capped the number of vehicles per company at 150, in addition to imposing
insurance and other safety requirements.3 3 That measure proved politically
unpopular, and a Lyft- and Uber-funded group collected enough signatures
from city residents to force a repeal referendum. 3 4 In light of that reality,
Mayor Murray put the ordinance on hold and negotiated directly with the
TNCs, ultimately arriving at a watered-down measure that did not include a
cap on the number of TNC vehicles.3 5 TNCs appeared to have become
popular enough that elected officials would pay a political price for limiting
their operation, or - perhaps worse - for prompting them to pack up and
leave Seattle rather than comply with regulation.36
With TNC regulation such a hot-button issue, the rulemaking
process required to implement the driver bargaining ordinance became a
political hot potato, ultimately extending the implementation timeline by
Office of the Mayor, Mayor Comments on TNC Ordinance, SEATTLE
Gov. (Dec. 14,
2015), http://murray.seattle.gov/mayor-comments-on-tnc-ordinance/.
32 Letter from Mayor Edward Murray to Seattle City Council (Dec. 14, 2015),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/293295028/Seattle-Mayor-Murray-letter-to-Council-RE-Uberunion-law.
33 Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124441 (Mar. 19, 2014), http://bit.ly/2vu678g.
34 Taylor Soper, Seattle Ride-Sharing Regulations Suspended; Mayor Wants to
Negotiate
with
Stakeholders,
GEEKWIRE
(Apr.
17,
2014),
https://www.geekwire.com/2014/ride-sharing-petition-seattle/.
35 Taylor Soper, Seattle Legalizes Uber, Lyft to Operate Without Caps, GEEKWIRE
(July
14
2014),
https://www.geekwire.com/2014/seattle-legalizes-uber-lyft-operatewithout-caps/.
36 For a more complete discussion of TNCs' political strategy, see Elizabeth Pollman
& Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship,90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 383-84 & 386
(2017) (describing how companies like Uber and Lyft avoid regulation, in part by
"operating in legal gray areas, growing 'too big to ban,' and mobilizing users for political
support").
31
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months. When the ordinance was enacted in December 2015, it designated
the city's office of Finance and Administrative Services (FAS) to enact
implementing rules by September 2016. In June 2016, FAS began holding
hearings aimed at gathering the information it would need to decide which
drivers would count as "qualifying drivers" under the ordinance - that is,
which drivers would be eligible to vote for union representation. However,
FAS quickly concluded that its hearings had not yielded enough
information, and sought more time from the city council to complete the
rulemaking process. The decision to seek more time would have been
unremarkable - except for the fact that FAS and the mayor also demanded
that the city council reclaim responsibility for deciding who would be a
qualifying driver, and then all but refused to make that politically
contentious decision. That posture prompted a brief standoff between the
two branches of city government, which was ultimately resolved when the
city council gave FAS an additional four months to complete rulemaking
and pointedly reiterated the driver bargaining ordinance's definition of
"qualifying driver," which included a list of factors that FAS was to take
into consideration during rulemaking.3 8
Ultimately, FAS finalized a rule reflecting a compromise position:
"qualifying drivers" would include anyone who had initiated a contractual
relationship with a driver coordinator at least 90 days before the ordinance's
commencement date, and who had driven at least 52 trips "during any threemonth period in the 12 months preceding the commencement date." 3 9 In
the nature of many compromises, this left both union and enterprise
representatives unhappy. Union representatives wanted only full-time
drivers, or those who leased or bought cars for the purpose of driving for a
37 Kevin Schofield, The Uber Driver Union Mess: It All Comes Down to One
Question, SCC INSIGHT (Aug. 23, 2016), https://sccinsight.com/2016/08/23/the-uberdriver-union-mess-it-all-comes-down-to-one-question/.
38 Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 125132 (Sep. 22, 2016) (stating that in defining
"qualifying driver," FAS "shall consider factors such as the length, frequency, total number
of trips, and average number of trips per drier completed by all of the drivers who have
performed trips in each of the four calendar months immediately preceding the
commencement date, for a particular driver coordinator, any other factors that indicate that
a driver's work for a driver coordinator is significant enough to affect the safety and
reliability of for-hire transportation, and standards established by other jurisdictions for
granting persons the right to vote to be represented in negotiations pertaining to the terms
and conditions of employment"). All but the last of those considerations are also listed in
the driver bargaining ordinance. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.3 10.110 (2017).
39 Seattle Director of Finances and Administrative Services, Rule FHR-1, Qualifying
Drivers
and
Lists
of
Qualifying
Drivers
(May
26,
2017),
http://clerk.seattle.gov/-CFs/CF_320270.pdf. The rule permits a 24-month time period for
military service members who cannot meet the 12-month requirement because of
deployment.
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TNC, to be permitted to vote. Conversely, Uber argued that every driver
should be allowed to vote, without regard to how much or little driving they
did. 4 1 The difference between those two positions was considerable,
especially considering Uber's assertion that over half of its Seattle drivers
worked fewer than ten hours per week.4 2
As this rulemaking progressed, Uber also launched a "no union"
campaign. (This was in addition to Uber's solicitation of drivers to submit
comments to FAS arguing that every Uber driver should be allowed to vote
in a union election.) Uber's campaign included phone calls to drivers,
wherein company representative claimed that "[t]his is simply a case where
collective bargaining and unionization do not fit the characteristics of the
work," and emphasized differences in how different Uber drivers operated.
- a rhetorical choice that was not without irony, considering Uber's "every
driver votes" position.4 3 Additionally, Uber created a series of commercials
and podcasts to discourage drivers from supporting a union drive,
suggesting that collective bargaining might destroy Uber drivers' flexibility,
or even drive the company out of business,4 4 and threatened to pull out of
Seattle if the ordinance took effect.4 5 And finally, operating on a third front,
Uber and Lyft began lobbying the state legislature to divest city authority
46
over TNCs, though that effort seems unlikely to bear fruit.
In May 2017, FAS's regulations were finalized, and Teamsters
Local 117 applied for and was granted QDR status; as of this writing, it is
the only QDR. Local 117 then declared its organizing targets, including
both Lyft and Uber. That declaration should have prompted the named
enterprises to turn over lists of qualifying drivers. However, as discussed in

Mike Richards, Seattle Pushfor Uber Union Vote Slowed; Automation is Coming, In
Time, LENS (Aug. 29, 2016), http://thelens.news/2016/08/29/seattle-push-for-uber-unionvote-slowed-automation-is-coming-in-time/.
41
id.
42
Uber, Call Script, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2729945-CallScript.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2017).
43 id.
Heidi Groover, As Seattle Uber Drivers Try to Unionize, the Company Doubles
Down
on
a
Scare
Campaign,
THE
STRANGER
(Dec.
7,
2016),
http://www.thestranger.com/news/2016/12/07/24731875/can-uber-convince-its-driversthey -dont-need-a-union.
Monica Nickelsburg, Uber GM Says Service May Leave Seattle if Landmark Union
Law is Implemented, GEEKWIRE (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.geekwire.com/2017/ubergm-says-service-may-leave-seattle-landmark-union-law-implemented/.
46 Sara Bernard, Are Uber and Lyft Plotting an End Run on Seattle Regs?, SEATTLE
WEEKLY (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.seattleweekly.com/news/are-uber-and-lyft-plottingan-end-run-around-seattle-regs/.
40
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the next section, the ordinance is presently enjoined.4 7
II. THE SEATTLE SOLUTION IN COURT

To date, corporate and ideological opponents of the ordinance have filed
two lawsuits in federal court, and a third in state court. 48 This section briefly
describes the challengers' legal theories. However, the bottom line is this:
each case was dismissed at the trial court level, though the plaintiffs in both
federal cases recently appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 49 The ordinance was
originally enjoined by the district court pending its decision in the two
federal cases; that injunction was lifted when the district court dismissed the
second of the two challenges.o As of this writing, the Ninth Circuit has
temporarily enjoined the ordinance while it considers the plaintiffs' motion
for an injunction pending appeal.
The most plausible of the three challenges was filed in federal district
court in Seattle by the Chamber of Commerce and Rasier, an Uber
subsidiary.5 2 That case raises a number of state and federal claims,5 3
including that the ordinance is preempted by federal labor and antitrust
law. 54
Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, No. 17-35640, at 2 (9th Cir. Sep. 7, 2107)
(order granting injunction).
Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv00370), 2017 WL 3267730; Clark v. City of Seattle (W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2017) (No.
2:17-cv-00382), 2017 WL 3641908; Rasier v. City of Seattle (Wa. Super. Ct. 2017) (No.
17-2-964-4).
49 Pls.' Notice of Appeal at 1, Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 1, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00370), 2017 WL 3267730; Pls.' Notice of Appeal at 1, Clark
v. City of Seattle (W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00382), 2017 WL 3641908.
50 Clark, 2017 WL 3641908
at 4.
51 Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, No. 17-35640, at 2 (9th
Cir. Sep. 7, 2107)
(order granting injunction)
52 Amended Complaint, Chamber of Commerce v. City of
Seattle (W.D. Wash. Apr
11, 2017) (No. 17-cv-00370), 2017 WL 1734748. The Chamber of Commerce initially
filed suit before FAS had promulgated regulations to implement the ordinance; that
complaint was substantively similar to the later one cited above and discussed in this essay,
though the later complaint added Rasier as a plaintiff. Cf Complaint, Chamber of
Commerce v. City of Seattle (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2016) (No. 2:16-cv-00322), 2016 WL
836320. However, the district court dismissed the case on standing grounds, rejecting the
Chamber's arguments that its members, including Uber and Washington taxi company
Eastside For Hire, were already being injured by the ordinance because they had decided to
spend money to discourage drivers from unionizing. Chamber of Commerce v. City of
Seattle (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2016) (No. C 16-0322), 2016 WL 4595981.
53 The state claims are not discussed in this Essay, but arise under the Washington
Consumer Protection Act and the Washington Public Records Act.
Amended Complaint at ¶ 1, Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle (W.D. Wash.
Apr 11, 2017) (No. 17-cv-00370), 2017 WL 1734748.
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The premise of the Chamber's antitrust claim recalls the regulation of
collective action in the United States before the Clayton Act's labor
exemption and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 5 The Chamber alleges that "[t]he
Ordinance unlawfully authorizes for-hire drivers to engage in . . . per se
illegal concerted action by forming a cartel (under the aegis of a QDR),
speaking as a single unit through an exclusive representative . . . and
engaging in horizontal fixing of prices and contractual terms and in
horizontal group boycotts." 5 6 The specific antitrust-related harms that the
Chamber alleges will result from collective bargaining include higher costs
for enterprises (because collective bargaining could result in improved pay
and benefits) and consumers (who would be required to pay more for rides
and, in the Chamber's assertion, "receive poorer service," presumably
because a CBA might restrict the number of new drivers, creating longer
wait times).
Seattle's main response (in addition to some justiciability arguments
that are beyond the scope of this essay) is that the ordinance meets the
requirements of the state action exemption from antitrust law, also known
as Parker immunity.
Parker immunity specifically exempts state
-59
sovereign acts from antitrust scrutiny. But municipalities and other nonSee Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liabilityfor Worker
Collective Action, 47 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 969 (2016); Daniel R. Ernst, The Labor
Exemption, 1908-1914, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1151, 1152-55 (1989); WILLIAM E. FORBATH,
LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991).
56 Amended Complaint at ¶ 60, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. City of Seattle
(W.D. Wash. Apr 11, 2017) (No. 17-cv-00370), 2017 WL 1734748.
57

Id. ¶64.

In addition, one might argue that the Clayton Act's labor exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 17
(2017), applies. The labor exemption states that "[n]othing contained in the antitrust laws
shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations,
instituted for the purposes of mutual help . . or to forbid or restrain individual members of
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof." Dmitri
Iglitzin and Jennifer L. Robbins have made a narrow argument for application of the labor
exemption, arguing that "labor organizations bargaining on behalf of for-hire drivers
pursuant to local legislation will be immune from antitrust liability if there is wage
competition between drivers operating as independent contractors for TNCs" and unionrepresented drivers who qualify as employees. Dmitri Iglitzin & Jennifer L. Robbins, The
City of Seattle's Ordinance Providing Collective Bargaining Rights to Independent
Contractor For-Hire Drivers: An Analysis of the Major Legal Hurdles, 38 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 57 (2017). However, that argument depends on the existence of
unionized, employee drivers who are competing with TNC drivers - a premise that will fail
in many cities. Others have attempted broader arguments that the labor exemption should
cover worker collective action, even if the workers at issue are independent contractors, or
that the boundaries of Section 1 of the Sherman Act should be interpreted more narrowly.
See, e.g., Paul, supra note 55 at 1040.
59 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
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sovereign actors that exercise delegated authority face a more exacting test
- they must show that their anticompetitive policy is both "one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy" and "actively
supervised by the State itself." 6 0

-

Washington law contains a broad and explicit grant of authority to
municipalities to regulate for-hire vehicles and taxis in ways that displace
61
competition. It also authorizes municipalities to regulate both taxis and
for-hire drivers by "regulating entry" into the business, imposing license
requirements, controlling rates and methods of payment, regulating routes,
requiring safety or insurance requirements, and enacting "any other
,,62
requirements adopted to ensure safe and reliable taxicab service.
Accordingly, the district court concluded that the "clear articulation" prong
of the Parker immunity test was satisfied: first, Washington law expressly
incorporates the idea of displacing competition; and second, it authorizes
the ordinance's particular method of regulation - collective bargaining
because it permits "any" requirement adopted in the service of safety and
reliability. On that point, it likely helped that the driver bargaining
ordinance references links between collective bargaining, driver safety, and
reliability, including the assertion that bargaining could "help ensure that
the compensation drivers receive for their services is sufficient to alleviate
undue financial pressure to provide transportation in an unsafe manner."63
Uber's recent bad press, including stories about drivers sleeping in their
cars and working dangerously long shifts, 6 4 may have also persuaded the
court that the ordinance was connected to safety. During oral argument, the
court referenced a recent New York Times story about Uber's use of
psychological tools that encourage drivers to spend more time behind the

wheel .65
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38 (1985); Cal. Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
61 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 81.72.200, 46.72.001 (2017) (providing,
with respect to both
taxis and for hire vehicles, that "it is the intent of the legislature to permit political
subdivisions of the state to regulate for hire transportation services without liability under
federal antitrust laws.").
62 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.72.160, 81.72.210
(2017).
63 Ordinance
¶ I.
60

64

See, e.g., Diana Kruzman, Some Uber Drivers Work Dangerously Long Shifts, USA

(July
10,
2017
9:34
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2017/07/10/some-uber-drivers-workdangerously-long-shifts/103090682/; Carolyn Said, Long-Distance Uber, Lyft Drivers'
TODAY

Crazy Commutes, Marathon Days, Big Paychecks, S.F. CHRON.

(Feb.

18, 2017),

http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Long-distance-Uber-Lyft-drivers-crazy10942919.php.
65

Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push its Drivers'Buttons,
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Next, the district court held that the second prong of the Parker
immunity test was also satisfied because the ordinance requires the FAS
director to approve any collective bargaining agreements resulting from the
66
ordinance.
The court rejected the Chamber's arguments that Parker
immunity requires state (rather than municipal) oversight, and that it was
insufficient for the FAS director to review only the final product of
bargaining but not the details of the organizing drive and subsequent
bargaining process. 67
Other federal claims in the Chamber's suit involved labor preemption.
Specifically, the Chamber argued for the application of both Machinists
preemption, which displaces states' regulation of conduct that the NLRA
left to the "free play of economic forces," 68 and Garmon preemption, which
displaces states' regulation of conduct that is covered or "arguably" covered
by the NLRA. 69
The Chamber pushed its Machinists argument much harder than its
Garmon argument. The Machinists argument relies on the Taft-Hartley
Act's exclusion of independent contractors from NLRA coverage. 7 0 The
Chamber's argument extrapolates from that exclusion to conclude that
Congress intended that "independent contractors should be unregulated and
excluded . . . from collective bargaining agreements" in general - not just
from those governed by the NLRA. But that argument also would require
the court to accept that Congress intended to treat independent contractors
differently than other groups of workers who are explicitly excluded from
NLRA coverage, such as public and agricultural workers, but who may
nonetheless unionize under state law. In support of this conclusion, the
Chamber argued that independent contractors resembled supervisors, who
were also excluded from NLRA coverage by the Taft-Hartley Act, and to
whom Machinists preemption does apply.7 2 The district court characterized
that argument as a "coincidence of timing," and concluded that independent
contractors are more analogous to public employees and agricultural
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
2,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-drivers-psychologicaltricks.html? r-1.
66 Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv00370), 2017 WL 3267730 at *6-7.
67
id.
68 Machinists v. Wisc. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976).
69 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
7o 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2017) ("The term 'employee' . . . shall not include any
individual . . having the status of an independent contractor.").
71 Amended Complaint at ¶ 77, Chamber of Commerce v.
City of Seattle (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 1, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00370), 2017 WL 3267730 at *11.
72 id.

The Seattle Solution

13

workers than to supervisors.7 3
The Chamber's Garmon preemption claim is particularly cynical,
because it forces the Chamber to argue TNC and taxi drivers arguably are
employees under the NLRA.74 Of course, TNCs have vehemently denied
that their drivers are employees in countless other forums. 5 This position
leaves the Chamber to walk a fine line, focusing on the idea that an NLRB
regional director or general counsel could make an (erroneous) argument
that drivers were employees. The tightrope act that this position requires
may explain why the Chamber did not attempt to advance its Garmon claim
during oral argument - but in any event, the district court found that
because "[n]either the Chamber nor the individual plaintiff has made even a
bare assertion that for-hire drivers are employees . . . the Chamber's claim
of Garmon preemption is not tethered to the facts alleged." 7 6
The second federal suit challenging the ordinance, Clark v. Seattle, was
filed by a group of drivers represented by the Freedom Foundation and the
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation. The Clark complaint
alleges that the ordinance violates or is preempted by the NLRA and that it
violates the First Amendment.
The Clark plaintiffs argue that the ordinance is inconsistent with
Sections 8(e) and 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, which respectively prohibit "hot
cargo" agreements and certain secondary activity by labor organizations.7 9
The plaintiffs' arguments under the two NLRA provisions are
fundamentally similar: both boil down to allegations that exclusive
representation under the ordinance arguably violates the NLRA by
73 Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv00370), 2017 WL 3267730 at *11 (concluding that supervisors were excluded from the
NLRA because their unionization "was deemed a threat to the very purposes of the Act as
well as the interests of both labor and management," whereas the exclusion of independent
contractors "was added to correct an NLRB interpretation that had wandered from
Congress' original intent").
Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 82, 86, Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 1, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00370), 2017 WL 3267730 at *11.
See generally O'Connor v. Uber Tech., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(denying that drivers are employees in federal court); Berwick v. Uber Tech., 2015 WL
4153765 (Cal. Dept. Lab.) (denying that drivers are employees in Cal. Dept. of Labor
adjudication); Aslam v. Uber BV [2017] I.R.L.R 4 (Oct. 28, 2016) (denying that drivers are
workers in London, UK Employment Tribunal).
76 Chamber of Commerce, 2017 WL 3267730, at*9.
Complaint, Clark v. City of Seattle (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-

00382).
Id.

¶ 5.

The Clark plaintiffs also set forth a claim based on the Driver's Privacy Protection
Act, though that claim is not discussed in this Essay.
79
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precluding companies from contracting with drivers under conditions other
than those established in the relevant collective bargaining agreements.80
The plaintiffs' First Amendment arguments are conceptually related to
the NLRA claims. They argue, first, that the exclusive representation
system violates drivers' rights of free speech and association by requiring
them to work under a negotiated agreement and precluding them from
attempting to negotiate their individual bargains.81 Second, they argue that
the ordinance's provision allowing EDRs and driver coordinators to enter
an agreement requiring drivers to become members of the EDR violates the
First Amendment. 82

The district court concluded that all of these claims were premature,
because they depend on the content of an as-yet hypothetical agreement
between an EDR and a driver coordinator, or on a labor organization
engaging in as-yet hypothetical secondary activity.8 3 In addition, the court
wrote that the NLRA claims would likely fail because an EDR certified
under the ordinance would not qualify as a "labor organization" subject to
the NLRA's unfair labor practice provisions, because by definition it would
not represent any employees covered by the Act. Regarding the plaintiffs'
First Amendment claims, the court concluded that the ordinance's exclusive
representation provision does not interfere with drivers' freedom of
expression, because drivers remain free to form any advocacy group or
advance any argument they wish (though the ordinance would preclude the
driver coordinators from striking a bargain with a group other than an
EDR).8 4 Finally, the court concluded that the drivers' other First
Amendment claim was premature, because it was based on the as-yetso Complaint at ¶ 65, Clark v. City of Seattle (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2017) ("A driver
coordinator . . would arguably violate NLRA Section 8(e) if it entered into an agreement
with a labor organization whereby the driver coordinator agreed to cease doing business
with independent contractors, drivers not represented by that labor organization, and/or not
subject to its collective bargaining agreements."); Complaint at ¶ 69, Clark v. City of
Seattle (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2017) ("A labor organization would arguably violate NLRA
Section 8(b)(4) if it threatened, coerced, or restrained drivers or driver coordinators . .
with the goal of forcing and/or requiring: (1) self-employed drivers to join the labor
organization; (2) driver coordinators to cease doing business with drivers not represented
by that labor organization and/or not subject to its agreements").
81 Id. ¶ 6 ("An EDR's authority under the Ordinance to act as the sole and exclusive
representative of drivers also prohibits or restricts drivers from speaking and contracting
with driver coordinators regarding the terms of their business relationship individually").
82
1d. ¶77.
83 Clark v. City of Seattle (W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00382), 2017 WL
3641908.
84 Id. at *3. Here, the court noted that other courts had universally
rejected similar
challenges to exclusive representation of "partial" public employees.
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unrealized possibility that an EDR and driver coordinator might negotiate a
union security clause.15
The third suit did not challenge the ordinance itself, but rather FAS's
implementing rules, and it was filed in King County Superior Court by Uber
subsidiary Rasier. 8 6 Rasier argued that the FAS's decision to engage in a
series of rulemakings on different aspects of the ordinance, instead of a
single rulemaking on every aspect, violated Washington law. Additionally,
Rasier argued that FAS's decision to exclude certain drivers from a union
election was arbitrary and capricious. The trial court rejected each of these
arguments, emphasizing agencies' broad latitude under Washington law.
III. EXPORTING THE SEATTLE SOLUTION?

)

This section looks beyond the specific legal challenges to the ordinance
and discusses three broader legal and political concepts: first, the
importance of the ordinance's novelty; second, the role of potential harm to
consumers; and third, the difficulty in deciding which drivers should be able
to participate in a union election. It concludes on two optimistic notes,
despite the possibility that the lawsuits discussed in the previous section
may ultimately prove successful. First, even if the Chamber's antitrust
claim (which I view as the most serious challenge to the ordinance8 7
ultimately succeeds, a legislative fix will likely be possible. Second, recent
events suggest that the political barriers to this type of regulation at the
municipal level are receding.
A. Does the Ordinance'sNovelty Help or Hurt?
Nearly all press accounts of the Seattle ordinance include a focus on its
novelty - it has been described as the nation's "first of its kind" in many
stories.88 In one sense, that characterization is entirely fair - the ordinance is
the first significant modern attempt by a state or local government to create
85

id.

Complaint, Rasierv. City of Seattle (Wash. Super. Ct. 2017) (No. 17-2-964-4).
The district court reached the same conclusion in granting the Chamber's motion for
a preliminary injunction. Chamber of Commerce v. Seattle (W.D. Wash. April 4, 2017)
(No. C17-037ORSL) (order granting preliminary injunctive relief) (concluding that the
Chamber of Commerce "raised serious questions" regarding its antitrust claims, but that it
was not likely to succeed on its other claims).
E.g., Daniel Beekman, Judge Tosses U.S. Chamber's Suit Against Seattle Over Uber
Union Law, Calling it Premature, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 9, 2016),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/judge-tosses-chambers-suit-againstseattle-over-uber-law/; Nick Wingfield & Mike Isaac, Seattle Will Allow Uber and Lyft
Drivers
to
Form
Unions,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
14,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/technology/seattle-clears-the-way-for-uber-driversto-form-a-union.html?mcubz=3.
86
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a collective bargaining framework for low-wage independent contractors
within an industry. But while the ordinance is new, the strategy is familiar:
the response to the increased prevalence of precarious work and fissured
workplaces has often been the adoption of sub-federal level collective
bargaining rights for workers left uncovered by the NLRA.89 Unions in
other cities have recently sought to assist TNC drivers in negotiating with
enterprises, either on a voluntary "consultation" basis or under the NLRA. 90
Thus, Seattle's innovation is to combine these existing developments into a
single approach to improve working conditions in the taxi and TNC
industry.
Both sides in the Chamber v. Seattle litigation attempted to make a
virtue out of the ordinance's novelty. At oral argument, the City Attorney
invoked the metaphor of states and localities as "laboratories of
experimentation" in arguing for deference to the city's legislative
determinations. But the plaintiffs' (anti-)novelty arguments were much
more extensive. First, they made a novelty argument premised on the nature
of TNCs themselves, repeating the oft-debunked claim that app-based
TNCs are not for-hire transportation businesses at all, but are instead
providers of new technologies that "are no more subject to regulation [under
state law authorizing municipal regulation of for-hire driving] than the
manufacturer of a GPS device would be if a driver happened to use it when
offering rides." 9 1 Appropriately, that claim failed, as it did in other cases in

8 In another relatively recent example, a list of states have created a mechanism for
government-funded home healthcare workers or childcare workers to bargain collectively
over employment conditions set by the state. As the district court observed, some of the
legal challenges to the ordinance - especially the Clarkplaintiffs' First Amendment claims
- were similar to challenges to homecare and childcare unionization statutes. Clark v.
Seattle (W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00382), 2017 WL 3641908 at *3. Of
course, one of those challenges resulted in the Supreme Court decision in Harrisv. Quinn,
134 S.Ct. 2618, 2634 (2014), where the Court relied on the underlying statute's novelty as
a basis to distinguish and criticize Abood v. DetroitRd. ofEduc., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
90 For example, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
backs the Independent Drivers Guild represents New York TNC drivers, but does not
engage in formal collective bargaining with enterprises. Noam Scheiber, Uber has a Union

of Sorts,

but Faces Doubts on

its Autonomy,

N.Y.

TIMES

(May

12,

2017),

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/business/economy/uber-driversunion.html?mcubz=3&_r-0. That arrangement followed an abortive attempt by the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1430, to petition for an NLRB
election for a group of LaGuardia-based Uber drivers. RC Petition, Case No. 29-RC168855 (Feb. 2, 2016), https://onlabor.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PET.29-RC168855.Initial2OPetition.pdf.
91 Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv00382), 2017 WL 3267730 at *5.
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which it was attempted.9 2
Second, the plaintiffs made an argument based on the purported novelty
of using collective bargaining as a method to regulate taxis and for-hire
drivers. That argument, like the one discussed in the previous paragraph,
was aimed at defeating the city's Parker immunity defense by establishing
that Washington law - in particular, the provision allowing municipalities to
adopt "any other requirements adopted to ensure safe and reliable for hire
vehicle transportation service" - did not authorize the ordinance. Although
it ultimately rejected the argument, the district court raised the same
question in its decision to preliminarily enjoining the ordinance.9 3 The
danger is that this argument, which has parallels to the anti-novelty rhetoric
that has taken hold in constitutional law, 94 might lead courts to adopt a kind
of clear statement rule when assessing whether state law authorizes
municipalities to adopt collective bargaining statutes similar to the Seattle
ordinance.
But that approach would be wrong for two reasons. First, it is
ahistorical. Examples abound in which legislatures implemented collective
bargaining schemes in order to improve the functioning of particular
industries, in both the public and private sectors.9 5 Thus, there is no reason
that courts should be especially skeptical of the idea that a statute
authorizing municipal regulation of an industry would include authorization
to regulate via a system of collective bargaining.
Second, collective bargaining - with its often-adversarial nature - is

unlikely to lead to unfair self-dealing of the type that has led the Supreme
Court to tighten Parker immunity's requirements in recent cases. 96 For
example, in the Supreme Court's most recent Parker immunity case, North
CarolinaState Board of DentalExaminers v. FTC, the Court reasoned that
"[1]imits on state-action immunity are most essential when the State seeks to
delegate its regulatory power to active market participants, for established
ethical standards may blend with private anticompetitive motives in a way
difficult even for market participants to discern." 97 That case involved a
92

E.g., O'Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
Chamber of Commerce, 2017 WL 3267730, at *4.
94 See generally, Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407 (2017).
95 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 279 (1936) (discussing legislative
purpose of bituminous coal conservation act); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 29 (1937) (discussing the NLRA); JOSEPH SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS:
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900-1962 (2004)
(discussing adoption of public sector labor law).
96 See generally Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The New Antitrust Federalism, 102 VA. L.
REV. 1387 (2016) (tracing the recent history of Parker immunity).
97 North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 1111 (2015);
93

18

The Seattle Solution

board comprised primarily of active market participants, who were
empowered to unilaterally drive out other market participants.9 8 But the
collective bargaining envisioned by the Seattle ordinance works much
differently, allowing workers to exercise countervailing power against large
enterprises but without power to set any working condition unilaterally. 99
Still, it would be naive to say that the lawsuits discussed in this essay
pose no threat to the ordinance, or that other states and cities considering
similar legislation would not risk litigation costs were they to follow
Seattle's lead - one double-edged feature of the Parker immunity defense is
that a decision on what anticompetitive measures are authorized by
Washington will not necessarily translate to California or New York.
Moreover, the current Supreme Court is likely to be hostile to novel forms
of workers' collective action, and even aside from that, the Court may
continue to narrow the scope of Parker immunity. However, if a court
ultimately finds the Seattle ordinance is not entitled to Parker immunity,
there still remains the possibility of a legislative fix. Such a fix would have
to take place at the state level if a court concludes that Washington did not
clearly articulate a policy of displacing competition through collective
bargaining, or that the state (rather than the city) must supervise the results
of drivers' bargaining under the ordinance. While perhaps politically
difficult, this legislative door would remain open.
B. Will the OrdinanceHelp or Hurt Consumers?
As discussed above, TNCs have argued against the Seattle ordinance
(both in the political sphere and in court) on the basis that it could hurt
consumers. For example, in its complaint, the Chamber of Commerce
alleged that collective bargaining might make Uber unprofitable in Seattle,
implying that it might abandon it as a market. 100 Outside of litigation, it has
made that threat explicitly. 101 Additionally, the Chamber of Commerce's
antitrust case includes allegations that consumers could be harmed by the
ordinance even if Lyft and Uber do not totally shut down in Seattle, if a
see also id. (arguing that the Supreme Court's approach in recent antitrust cases "help[s]
curb anticompetitive rent seeking made inevitable by industry self-regulation").
98 North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 135 S.Ct. at 1108 (explaining that
the challenged Board of Dental Examiners was comprised mostly dentists who charged
"substantial fees" for teeth whitening services, and who acted to drive non-dentists who
engaged in teeth whitening from the market).
99 See Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargainingand the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 245, 255 (1987) (describing view that collective bargaining can be efficient
because it allows workers to exercise countervailing power).
100 Amended Complaint at ¶ 57, Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 1, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00370), 2017 WL 3267730.
101 Nickelsburg, supra note 45.
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collective bargaining agreement caps the number of drivers for a particular
-102

enterprise.

Each of these claims seems to rest on a questionable foundation. For
example, Uber's threats that it will abandon Seattle if collective bargaining
renders it unprofitable are unconvincing in light of recent media reports that
Uber as a company is already operating at an overall loSS. 10 3 Likewise, the
suggestion that collective bargaining might lead to a cap on the number of
new TNC drivers also seems implausible. First, "number of drivers" is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining under the ordinance; while that fact does
not rule out the possibility that bargaining on that issue could occur, it
certainly is not obvious that it will. Second, the FAS director is charged
with reviewing proposed collective bargaining agreements according to
criteria that include the agreements' affects on consumers - so a cap on new
drivers that would decrease TNC availability would likely be rejected. 10 4
Beyond that, drivers could more directly address the problem of their low
effective hourly rates by seeking minimum-pay guarantees during
bargaining. o0 Conversely, a collective bargaining agreement that improves
drivers' take-home pay and makes other improvements is likely to lead
existing drivers to spend more time driving while also encouraging more
people to sign up to drive.
Still, TNCs (and others) have been effective at conveying the message
that industry regulation is bad for consumers, and elected officials may
reasonably fear that regulation will have negative political consequences.
But here again, the Seattle example suggests that there is reason for
102 See Amended Complaint at ¶ 64, Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 1, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00370), 2017 WL 3267730; see also supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
103 Mike Isaac, Uber Limits Loss to $708 Million in First Quarter, N.Y. TIMES (May

31,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/3 1/technology/uber-limits-loss-to-708million-in-first-quarter.html?mcubz=3&_r-0.
104 Seattle Director of Finances and Administrative Services, Rule FHDR-6, Approval
of an Agreement, Changes to an Existing Agreement, and Withdrawal of an Existing
Agreement at *2 (May 26, 2017), http://clerk.seattle.gov/-CFs/CF_320275.pdf.
1os The FTC recently settled a complaint with Uber alleging that the company had
misled drivers about their likely earnings potential. FTC, Uber Agrees to Pay $20 Million
to Settle FTC Charges That It Recruited Prospective Drivers with Exaggerated Earnings
Claims, Jan. 19, 2017, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/uberagrees-pay-20-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-recruited.
And recent media accounts have
reflected some for-hire drivers' complaints that their take-home pay is well below their
expectations. E.g., Laura Sydell, Survey Finds Lyft Drivers Happier Than Uber, Though
Pay
Has
Declined,
NPR
(Jan.
21,
2017),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/01/21/510479642/survey-finds-lyftdrivers-happier-than-uber-though-pay-has-declined (reporting that "price drops" for TNC
fares "are taking their toll on drivers who must work longer hours to make a living wage").
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optimism. First, there is the fact that although the city's first attempt to
regulate TNCs was met with a successful referendum petition, the driver
bargaining ordinance was not. This is likely due to two factors - first,
growing acceptance that TNCs should be regulated; and second, a public
sense that the ordinance's goals - protecting TNC workers rather than taxi
monopolies - were legitimate. 1 0 6 As evidence of this dynamic, both recent
mayoral candidates pledged to facilitate collective bargaining by more
workers, suggesting that Seattle's new mayor, Jenny Durkan, will not share
former mayor Murray's reticence regarding the ordinance. 1 0 7
C. Who Should Vote in the Gig Economy?
Any attempt to facilitate collective bargaining by app-based workers is
likely to encounter controversy over the issue of which workers should
vote, especially when the results affect conditions for all workers on a given
platform. On one hand, there is appeal to the position that full
enfranchisement is the most democratic solution: everyone who works for a
platform, even if they work only a minimal amount, should have a say in
their working conditions. On the other hand, that rule could present an
insurmountable organizing challenge, allowing workers who spend very
little time working on a particular platform to control working conditions
for those who work full-time. In addition, as the case of the Seattle
ordinance illustrates, any decision to allow fewer than all workers to vote is
likely to result in legal challenges under state administrative procedures
laws. One middle-ground position might be to establish a proportional
voting system, in which workers receive additional votes based on the
amount of time they have worked on a platform in a given period of time
leading up to the election. But that scheme could be difficult to administer.
Ultimately, there is no perfect answer to this question, and the most
intuitive system - universal voting - could render union rights illusory.
CONCLUSION

A prediction: within the next three years, there will be low-wage
independent contractors who are unionized under state or local law. This is
not to say progress will be easy; Uber and other TNCs, as well as other
106

See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 120-21 (2016)

(arguing that "[w]hile consumers largely benefit from requiring platform transportation
companies to have similar safety and insurance standards as taxis, the same is not true
about restrictions on prices, routes, and entry").
107 Heidi Groover, Jenny Durkan and CaryMoon Support Domestic Worker's Bill of
Rights, THE STRANGER (Sep. 1, 2017),

http://www.thestranger.com/slog/2017/09/01/25389816/jenny-durkan-and-cary-moonpropose-domestic-workers-bill-of-rights.
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types of entities that rely on independent contractors, have every incentive
to engage in prolonged litigation and to run aggressive anti-union
campaigns. And early losses could deplete the political will that this project
requires. Still, the formula is already apparent: progressive states and cities
will respond to workers' protest against intolerable working conditions by
facilitating collective bargaining, a solution that is simultaneously novel and
tried-and-true.

